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Abstract
Security of mobile communications comes with the cost
of computational overhead. Reducing the overhead in security computations is critical to ensure the overall performance of a mobile network. In this paper, we present the
notion of online/ofﬂine signcryption, where most of computations are carried out ofﬂine and the online part of our
scheme does not require any exponent computations and
therefore is very efﬁcient. Our scheme allows any third party
to verify the encryption without compromising conﬁdentiality. We also show that our scheme is secure against existential forgery under chosen message attacks and adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks under the notion of indistinguishability of ciphertext.

than that of wired communication. The situation gets further complicated if the users are allowed to cress security
domains. A mobile system is reachable at any location and
at any time. This creates greater concern about privacy issues among the potential users.
Security comes with cost. When communication ﬂows
are encrypted or signed digitally, the computational cost
will inevitably be added to the total expenses. Therefore,
ﬁnding efﬁcient security algorithms for secure mobile communications becomes an importance task. In this paper, we
propose an ofﬂine signcryption scheme where most of computations for signing and encrypting a message are carried
out ofﬂine and the corresponding online computation is very
efﬁcient.

1.1. Previous Work
Key Words: Mobile security, Signcryption, Public-key
Cryptography.

1. Introduction
Use of mobile personal systems in an open networked
environment is very likely to revolutionize the way we use
computers. This raises several issues with regard to information security and privacy, system dependability and
availability. A networked environment is susceptible to a
number of security threats. These include: masquerading,
unauthorized use of resources, unauthorized disclosure and
ﬂow of information, unauthorized alteration of resources
and information, repudiation of actions, unauthorized denial of service. The mobile environment aggravates some of
the above security concerns and threats. Because the connection to wireless link may be easy, the security of wireless communication can be compromised much more easily
∗
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Digital signatures are used to ensure the authenticity of
information and its sender, whereas the information conﬁdentiality is achieved using encryption schemes. Hence
to achieve both authenticity and conﬁdentiality both signing and encryption techniques are needed. That is, to secure the message, it is ﬁrstly signed and then encrypted.
The total computational cost therefore includes the computational costs for performing digital signature and encryption. The notion of signcryption was introduced by Zheng
[11], with the goal of achieving greater efﬁciency than when
carrying out the signature and encryption operations separately. Signcryption schemes can achieve both authenticity
and conﬁdentiality in public key setting.
The notion of online/ofﬂine signature was introduced
by Even, Goldreich, and Micali [5]. In this notion, signing
phase is broken into two parts. The ﬁrst part is ofﬂine, independent of the message to be signed, while the second
part is online once the message is presented. To ensure that
both online signing and veriﬁcation are efﬁcient, the major
computational overhead is shifted to the ofﬂine part. Their
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method uses a one-time signature scheme, i.e., a scheme
which can securely sign only a single message. The essence
of their method is to apply (online) the ordinary signing algorithm to authenticate a fresh one-time veriﬁcation key,
and then to apply (online) the one-time signing algorithm,
which is typically very fast. Since Even, Goldreich, and Micali’s online/ofﬂine signature has a very inefﬁcient tradeoff
between the size of the keys and the complexity of the onetime signing algorithm, it is not practical. Shamir and Tauman [9] proposed an improved version that is more practical.
The notion of online/ofﬂine signcryption was introduced
by An, Dodis, and Tabin [1]. In their paper, they did not give
any concrete method in this work, since they were only interested in general security proofs on signcryption schemes.
Like an online/ofﬂine signature scheme, an online/ofﬂine
signcryption should satisfy a basic property, namely efﬁciency in the online computation. All expensive operations
such as exponent computations should be left ofﬂine in the
ﬁrst phase of the scheme. It is reasonable to assume that
the ofﬂine operations are independent of the particular message to be signed, since the message only becomes available at a later stage. The second phase is performed online, once the message is presented. We are interested in online/ofﬂine signcryption schemes in which the ofﬂine stage
is feasible and the online operation, including a symmetrickey encryption and an online signing part, is fast.

1.2. Our Contribution
In this paper, we extend the notion of online/ofﬂine signcryption by An, Dodis, and Tabin and provide a concrete
scheme. In our scheme, the online part does not require
any exponent computations so it is very efﬁcient. We utilize the notion of short signatures [2]; therefore, online signature part of our scheme is very short. We prove that our
scheme is secure. It is even more secure then the original
signcryption, since to break the scheme, we need to break
the combination of the computationally hard problems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we deﬁne our scheme and give some basic deﬁnitions and security requirements. In Section III, we present
our scheme and discuss its properties. In Section IV, we provide a concrete proof on the security of our scheme. In Section V, we conclude the paper.

2. Deﬁnitions
In this section, we provide deﬁnitions of our protocol and
its security requirements.

Deﬁnition 1 Our signcryption scheme SC is a triple of
polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen, SigEnc, VerDec),
where
• KeyGen(1 ) is a polynomial algorithm that takes as
input the security parameter  and outputs a pair of
keys (SDK, VEK). SDK is the user’s sign/decrypt key,
which is kept secret, and VEK the user’s verify/encrypt
key, which is made public.
• SigEnc, a polynomial algorithm, takes as input the
sender S’s secret key SDK and the receiver R’s public key VEK and a message m from the associated
message space M and outputs a signcryption s ←
SigEncSDK,VEK (m). This algorithm is split into two
parts: online and ofﬂine. The ofﬂine part does not require the message to be signcrypted and produces an
ofﬂine signature S and a secret key K to be used for
the ofﬂine part. In the online part, The online signature
is converted into the fully signature with the given message and the associated secret key related to K and the
message is encrypted with the key associated with K.
• VerDec is a deterministic de-signcryption algorithm
that takes as input the signcrypted message u, the receiver’s secret key SDK and the sender S’s public key
VEK and outputs m or ⊥, where ⊥ indicates that the
message wa not signcrypted properly.
We require our scheme to be secure against existential
forgery under chosen message attacks (EF-CPA) and adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks under the notion of indistinguishability of ciphertext (IND-CCA).
The security of the ofﬂine signing part of the protocol is based on so-called q-Strong Difﬁe-Hellman Problem
(q-SDHP) introduced in [2], where they used this notion
to achieve Strong Existential Unforgeability under chosen
message attacks. We will make use this notion in the protection of the sender’s authenticity.
-CPA (t
Deﬁnition 2 A
forger
AqEF-SDH
q -SDH , qq -SDH , )
breaks an SC scheme (ofﬂine signing part) if
-CPA (t, q
AqEF-SDH
q -SDH , q -SDH ) runs in time at most tq -SDH ,
makes at most qq-SDH ofﬂine signing queries, and
Adv SCAqEF--SDH
CPA (tq -SDH , qq -SDH , q -SDH ) is at least q -SDH .
The ofﬂine signing is (tq-SDH , qq-SDH , q-SDH )-existentially
unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack
against q-SDH if no forger (tq-SDH , qq-SDH , q-SDH )-breaks
it.
The security of the encryption part in our scheme given
in Section 3 refers to the Computational Difﬁe Hellman
(CDH) problem, where the encryption key can be computed
if the CDH problem is computable in polynomial time. We
required that the encryption part is secure against IND-CCA
if the CDH problem is hard.

Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA’05)
1550-445X/05 $20.00 © 2005 IEEE

IND-CCA
Deﬁnition 3 An adversary ACDH
(tCDH , qCDH , CDH )breaks an SC scheme (encryption and online signing) if
IND-CCA
ACDH
runs in time at most tCDH , makes at most qCDH
queries to CDH oracle, and Adv CDHACDH
IND-CCA is at least
CDH . The encryption and online signing are (tCDH , qCDH ,
CDH )-secure under IND-CCA if no adversary (tCDH , qCDH ,
CDH )-breaks it.

The online signing part in our scheme given in Section
3 is a variant of Schnorr’s signature scheme; The security
refers to the elliptic curve discrete log (EDL) problem. The
security of this kind of problems has been described by
Pointcheval and Stern [8] under random oracle assumptions.
Their notions are also suitable for elliptic curve settings. We
refer this problem to as PC-EDL. The online signing part is
secure against EF-CPA if solving PC-EDL in polynomial
time is negligible. The security of the online signing part is
then deﬁned as follows.
-CPA
Deﬁnition 4 An adversary AEF
PC-EDL (tPC-EDL , qPC-EDL ,
-CPA
PC-EDL )-breaks a SC scheme (online signing) if AEF
PC-EDL
runs in time at most tPC-EDL , makes at most qPC-EDL
queries to PC-EDL oracle, and Adv PC-EDLAEF
-CPA is
PC-EDL
at least PC-EDL . The encryption and online signing are
(t, qPC-EDL , PC-EDL )-secure under EF-CPA if no adversary (tPC-EDL , qPC-EDL , PC-EDL )-breaks it.
We require our scheme to be secure against EF-CPA on
the signing part and IND-CCA on the encryption part. To
break the scheme, the adversary has to solve q-SDH, CDH,
and PC-EDL problems.

2.1. Bilinear Pairings
In the section, we review some concepts in bilinear pairings provided by Boneh and Franklin [3].
Deﬁne two cyclic groups G1 , G2 . G1 is an additive
group and G2 is multiplicative group, where both group
have a prime order p. Let e be a computable bilinear map
e : G1 × G1 → G2 . For a, b ∈ Zp and P, Q ∈ G1 , we have
e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab . We also require non-degeneration
e(P, P ) = 1.
Joux and Nguyen [6] showed that an efﬁciently computable bilinear map e provides an algorithm for solving
the Decision Difﬁe-Hellman problem (DDH). That is given
P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G1 and a, b, c ← Zp , decide whether
?

c = ab ← Zq . This is because e(aP, bP ) = e(P, cP ). The
computational Difﬁe-Hellman problem is still hard. Let a, b
be chosen from Zp at random and P be a generator chosen
from G1 at random. Given (P, aP, bP ), it is hard to compute abP ← G1 .

2.2. The Strong Difﬁe-Hellman Assumption
In [2], the strong Difﬁe-Hellman Assumption is referred
to as q-SDH, where they utilised a map for two cyclic
groups of prime order p, where possibly two cyclic groups
are the same. For simplicity, we assume that two cyclic
groups both are the same additive group. Therefore, we
need to rewrite q-SDH.
Let P be a generator of G1 . The q-SDH problem in G1 is deﬁned as follows: given a (q + 1)-tuple
1
P ),
(P, xP, x2 P, · · · , xq P ) as input, output a pair (c, x+c
where c ← Zp . An algorithm A has advantage  in solving q-SDH in G1 if


1
2
q
P r A(P, xP, x P, · · · , x P = (c,
P ) > ,
x+c
where the probability is over the random choice of x in Zp
and the random bits consumed by A.
Deﬁnition 5 We say that the (q, t, )-SDH assumption holds in G1 if no t-time algorithm has advantage at
least  in solving the q-SDH problem in G1 .
In [2], it is proved that the q-SDH assumption has similar properties to the Strong RSA problem and they therefore
view q-SDH as a discrete logarithm analogue of the Strong
RSA assumption. A weaker version of the q-SDH assumption was previously used by Mitsunari, Sakai, and Kasahara
[7] to construct a traitor tracing system. It was also used in
[10] to prove security in their short signature scheme.

3. The Scheme
In this section, we present our online/ofﬂine signcryption scheme that satisﬁes the model introduced in the previous section. Assume that Alice and Bob are the sender and
the receiver, respectively. The protocol is described as follows.
• KeyGen. Take  as input and generate Alice’s key tuple
(Ppub1 , Ppub2 , x, y), where Ppub1 = xP, Ppub2 = yP .
P ∈ G1 is a public generator and x, y ← Zq are
the associated private keys. The same key generator
KeyGen generates Bob’s key tuple (PpubB , xb ), where
PpubB = xb P and xb ∈ Zq is the private key of Bob.
We have omitted the other key pair, since it is not used
by Bob.
• SigEnc. This step is split into two phases, online and
ofﬂine. The ofﬂine phase results in an ofﬂine part of
the signature and the encryption key for the ofﬂine
phase. The ofﬂine phase produces the ofﬂine signa1
P and the keys (y −1 , k1 , k2 ) for the
ture S = x+ry
online phase, where k1 , k2 are generated from the key
generation function KDF (K), where K = ryPpubB ,
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r ∈ Zp . In the online phase, the message encryption is done with k1 and a symmetric-key encryption
algorithm such as AES. The resultant ciphertext is
c = Ek1 (m), m ← M = Zp . The online signature is
computed as σ = r − hy −1 , h = H(m, k2 ). The signing scheme is actually a variant of the Schnorr’s signature scheme. The full signature is thus s = (c, σ, h, S).
• VerDec. The veriﬁcation phase requires the public
key of the senders and the public key the receiver.
The correct veriﬁcation requires to verify the equality e(hP + σPpub2 + Ppub1 , S) = e(P, P ) and correctly generate xb (hP + σPpub2 ) = K. Consequently,
correctly decrypt the message Dk1 (c) = m and verify h = H(m, k2 ).
Correctness: The veriﬁcation of the signcryption protocol
is as follows:
e(hP + σPpub2 + Ppub1 , S)
1
= e(
(hP + (r − hy −1 )yP + xP ), P )
x + ry
= e(P, P ).
xb (hP + σPpub2 )
= xb hP + xb (r − hy −1 )yP
= xb yrP
= K.

Third party veriﬁcation: The signcryption can be veriﬁed
by a third party, since the veriﬁcation process does not require the veriﬁer to know the message. By verifying the following equality,
?

e(hP + σPpub2 + Ppub1 , S) = e(P, P ),
the third party is assured of the correctness of the signcryption.
Length of the signing part: The signcryption consists of
(c, σ, h, S), where the signing part comprises (σ, h, S). The
size of σ, h, and S are log2 p, 160 bits, and log2 ρ respectively; therefore the total length is log2 p + log2 ρ + 160,
1
where ρ is the safe length for G1 . Note that S = x+ry
P =
1
P
.
It
is
comparable
to
[2,
4].
We
will
prove
the
signx+yσ+h
ing part is secure against EF-CPA.
Performance: In an online/ofﬂine scheme, the ofﬂine phase
must be very efﬁcient and requires minimum computation.
Our protocol is designed to meet this requirement. All expensive computations are done in the ofﬂine phase. The online phase consists of only simple computations including
one hashing, one multiplication, and a symmetric-key encryption.

4. Security
As deﬁned in Section 2, we split the security analysis
into three cases in terms of the ofﬂine signing part, the computation of K, and the ofﬂine signing part. The encryption
part of the protocol should be secure against IND-CCA. The
security of the encryption part is based on the CDH problem. That is, given P , Ppub2 and PpubB , compute yxb P that
leads to K = ryxb P , where r is a random number selected
from Zp . The following theorem shows that our scheme is
secure against EF-CPA and IND-CCA.
Theorem 1 Suppose the CDH-(tCDH , qCDH , CDH ),
PC-EDL-(tPC-EDL , qPC-EDL , PC-EDL ), and q-SDH-(tq-SDH ,
qq-SDH , q-SDH ) assumptions hold. Then our signcryption scheme is (t, qSC , )-secure against EF-CPA and
IND-CCA, provided that
t ≤ tCDH + tPC-EDL + tq-SDH − O(qSC ),
qSC = qCDH + qPC-EDL + qq-SDH ,
 = CDH · PC-EDL · q-SDH .
The proof of Theorem 1 is described in three experiments
given in the next three subsections.
Assume A is a forger that that (t, qSC , )-breaks the signcryption scheme. For convenience, we will denote by A
IND-CCA
-CPA
EF-CPA
, AEF
all ACDH
PC-EDL , and Aq -SDH . A takes advantage of
three separate algorithms BCDH , BPC-EDL , and Bq-SDH that,
by interacting with A, solve the following problems respectively,
• the CDH problem in time tCDH and probability CDH .
• the PC-EDL problem in time tPC-EDL , which is related
to the discrete log problem, and probability PC-EDL ,
and
• the q-SDH in time tq-SDH and probability q-SDH .

4.1. Experiment 1: A interacts with BCDH
A interacts with BCDH , expecting output Z = yxb P .
BCDH is given (P, Ppub2 , PpubB ).
Query: A sends qCDH queries to BCDH . BCDH must respond
with guesses Zi , i = 1, · · · , qCDH .
Response: BCDH outputs Zi , i = 1, · · · , qCDH with probability Pr(Z = yxb P |P, Ppub2 , PpubB ) = qCDH /p that it returns the correct value. Here, we assume that BCDH does not
repeat the values that have been used.
Output: Algorithm A outputs a forgery Z∗ which is randomly selected from qCDH outputs Zi , i = 1, · · · , qCDH . A
then picks r ∈ Zp at random and computes K∗ = rZ∗ as
output and split it into k1∗ , k2∗ with KDF (K∗ ).
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4.2. Experiment 2: A interacts with BPC-EDL
A now interacts with BPC-EDL , aiming on solving the
PC-EDL problem under adaptively chosen-message attack.
We utilise Pointcheval and Stern’s method based on Forking Lemma [8]. Assume there is a random oracle OH in
which takes as input k and a message mi and outputs hi ,
where k is a random number. Also assume there is an online signing oracle Oσ that takes as input hi and outputs an
online signing value σi .
Query: A outputs r, k, and a list of distinct qSC messages
m1 , · · · , mqPC-EDL ∈ M, where qPC-EDL < q.
Response: BPC-EDL must respond with a list of online signing values σ1 , · · · , σqPC-EDL on qPC-EDL messages from A.
BPC-EDL does it with the aid of two oracles:
• Make qPC-EDL queries to the random oracle OH on
input m1 , · · · , mqPC-EDL and k2∗ . OH responds with
h1 , · · · , hqPC-EDL .
• Then, make qPC-EDL queries m1 , · · · , mqPC-EDL to the
online signing oracle Oσ that in turn responds with the
triple (Ri , hi , σi ) for i = 1, · · · , qPC-EDL . During the
process, the signing oracle also made queries to oracle OH . Ri is the signing commitment Ri = ri P for a
random ri .
Output: Given the result and Ppub2 , A can verify
?

σi Ppub2 = Ri + hi P . According to the Forking Lemma
[8], two valid signatures can be resulted.
Lemma 1 Assume that, within time bound tPC-EDL , A produces, with probability PC-EDL ≥ 7qPC-EDL /2 , a valid signature (m, R, h, σ). Then there is another machine which
has control over A and produces two valid signatures
(m, R, h, σ) and (m, R, h , σ  ) such that h = h , in expected time t < 84480 · tPC-EDL · qPC-EDL /PC-EDL .
−1



 −1

Obviously, given σ = r + hy and σ = r + h y , A
hi −hj
can compute y = σ−σ
 .
Experiment 2 is independent of Experiment 1, since k2∗
does not inﬂuence the result.

4.3. Experiment 3: A interacts with Bq-SDH
Assume y is known due to Experiment 2. The online sig1
P for m = ry, which
nature can be rewritten as S = x+m
is the “weekly secure” scenario of the Boneh and Boye’s
scheme [2]. Then, we can utilise their notion of the q-SDH
problem and the associated lemma:
Lemma 2 Suppose the (t , q, q-SDH )-SDH assumption holds in G1 . Then the online part of the signature
in the signcryption scheme is (t, qq-SDH , q-SDH )-secure

against existential forgery under a chosen message attack provided that
tq-SDH ≤ t − O(q 2 ), qq-SDH < q.
Proof: A, by interacting with Bq-SDH , solves the q problem
in time tq-SDH with advantage q-SDH . Algorithm Bq-SDH
is given a instance (P, A1 , · · · , Aq ) of the q-SDH problem,
where Ai = xi P ∈ G1 for i = 1, · · · , q and some unknown
1
P ) for
x ∈ Z∗p . Bq-SDH ’s goal is to produce a pair (c, x+c
∗
some c ∈ Zp . Bq-SDH does so by interacting with A as follows:
Query: A outputs a list of distinct qSC messages
m1 , · · · , mqq-SDH ∈ M, where qq-SDH < q. BB sets
qq-SDH = q − 1.
Response: Bq-SDH must respond with a public key and the
signatures Si on the q −1 messages from A. Let f (z) be the
q−1
q−1
polynomial f (z) = i=1 (z + mi ) = i=0 ai z i , where
a0 , · · · , aq−1 ∈ Zp are coefﬁcients of the polynomial f (z).
Compute:
q−1

ai Ai = f (x)P
P =
i=0

P  =

q


ai−1 Ai = xf (x)P = xP  .

i=1

The public key given to A is (P  , P  ). For each i =
1, · · · , q−1, Bq-SDH must generate a signature Di on mi . To
do so, let fi (z) be the polynomial fi (z) = f (z)/(z +mi ) =
q−2
q−1
j
j=1,j=i (z + mj ). We expend fi and fi (z) =
j=0 bij z .
Compute
Si =

q−2


bij Aj = fi (x)P =

j=0

1
P  ∈ G1 .
x + mi

Si is a valid signature on mi under the public key (P  , P  ),
since e(mi P  + P  , Si ) = e(P  , P  ).
Output: A returns a forgery (m∗ , S∗ ) such that S∗ ∈ G1 is
a valid signature on m∗ ∈ Z∗q and m∗ ∈ {m1 , · · · , mq−1 }
since there is only one valid signature per message. We have
e(m∗ P  + P  , S∗ ) = e(P  , P  ), therefore
S∗ =

1
f (x)
P =
P.
x + m∗
x + m∗

Using long division we write the polynomial f as
f (z) = γ(z)(z + m∗ ) + γ−1 for some polynomial
q−2
i
γ(z) =
i=0 γi z and some γ−1 ∈ Zp . Then the rational fraction f (z)/(y + m∗ ) can be written as
q−2

f (z)/(y + m∗ ) =
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γ−1
+
γi y i .
z + m∗ i=0

(z + m∗ ) does not divide f (z). Note γ−1 = 0, f (z) =
q−1
i=1 (z + mi ) and m∗ ∈ {m1 , · · · , mq−1 }. Then, Bq -SDH
computes


q−1

1
1
S∗ +
W =
(−γi )Ai =
P.
γ−1
x + m∗
i=0
and returns (m∗ , W ) as the solution to the q-SDH instance.

4.4. Security of the Receiver
The security of the receiver is related to the conﬁdentiality of the message. Only the receiver can decrypt the ciphertext c to obtain the message. In other words, only the
receiver can compute the decryption key K. The security
of the receiver relies on hardness of the CDH problem. To
compute K = xb (hP + σPpub2 ) without knowing the secret key xb , we need to compute xb yP from given P , Ppub2
and PpubB , which has been discussed previously.
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5. Conclusion
We have proposed the ﬁrst online/ofﬂine signcryption
scheme from bilinear pairings. In our scheme, the computation performed online is very efﬁcient, since it does not require any exponent computations. Our online/ofﬂine signcryption can be veriﬁed by any third party, because the veriﬁcation does not take the corresponding message as input. We have also provided a security proof to show that
our scheme is secure against IND-CCA and EF-CPA. We
showed that the security of our scheme is based on CDH,
PC-EDL, and q-SDH. The total time of breaking our scheme
is the sum of times required for breaking all these hard problems.
Our scheme is especially suitable for a mobile environment, in particular, for low power mobile devices, because
the online security computation part is very efﬁcient.
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